










































































This  paper  reexamines the cartel problem by studying the
private discussions within one cartel.  While we find much that is
in accord with George Stigler’s (1964) basic insight that firms
would structure an agreement conscious of their later incentive to
cheat on it, we also uncover puzzles for established theory, and
identify elements that a richer theory should encompass, especially
regarding the role of communication in collusion.
Our window into the inner workings of a cartel is a remarkable
series of notes on the weekly meetings of the Sugar Institute.
This trade association was formed in December 1927, in the wake of
several years of falling margins and excess capacity, by fourteen
firms comprising nearly all the cane sugar refining capacity in the
United States.  It operated until 1936, when the Supreme Court
ruled its practices illegal. 
Among the top executives in regular attendance at the meetings
was Louis V. Placé, Vice President of McCahan, a mid-size refinery
in Philadelphia.  Placé, who was "in charge of all activities of
the company except production and raw sugar purchases",1 wrote over
500 pages of single spaced detailed notes on the Board of
Directors, Executive Committee, and Enforcement Committee meetings
from January 1929 through mid-1930.  He also reported on the
informal gatherings that followed them, and private conversations
with other refiner representatives and Institute personnel.2  Since
the memos circulated among only some six McCahan executives, they3
are extremely candid.  Under cross-examination at the trial, Placé
claimed to have regularly destroyed them upon receiving the much
less revealing official minutes.3  Placé’s own notes catch the
President of American in an act of perjury,4 and reveal both the
refiners’ legal strategy, and their political machinations.5
For economists, Place's notes are a unique information trove
on cartel behavior.  Participants in a modern cartel are unlikely
to create such detailed and contemporaneous documents of
decision-making, due to legal concerns.  Moreover, although
antitrust agencies can subpoena firm records and interview market
participants, strict confidentiality rules keep what they learn
from academic research, except by way of the rare trial.
Placé’s memos serve us in two ways.  First, they are a record
of the communication among the refiners.  Here are announcements of
impending actions that firms did not wish misconstrued as market
stealing, charges of cheating, threats of retaliation and
deliberations over cooperative actions that were jointly profitable
but singly unprofitable.
Second, the memos reveal the reasoning behind firms’ actions.
This is a type of evidence that economists have tended to shy away
from.  Milton Friedman (1953) would judge a theory solely by its
predicted outcomes.  But we agree with Alan Blinder (1993) that a
firm's explanation of its conduct is also proof, since a theory
describes the “chain of reasoning” which motivates the firm.4
Indeed, participants’ beliefs are an integral part of many game
theoretic models.  Furthermore, because like Ariel Rubinstein
(1992) we view "a model [as] an approximation of [the players']
perception and not an approximation of an objective description of
reality", we think it valuable to document how colluding firms
viewed their environment.
The Sugar Institute never directly fixed prices nor allocated
market shares.  There is no indication or legal finding of either.6
Instead, it fixed rules.  These rules, whose main principles were
stated in its Code of Ethics7 and whose details were promulgated in
successive Code Interpretations, covered every conceivable aspect
of the distribution and marketing of sugar other than the basis
price itself.  In this way, the refiners eliminated the
differential treatment of customers and harmonized contractual
practices, thus facilitating the detection of secret price cuts.
In his seminal work on collusion, Stigler (1964)  identified
the ability both to detect price-cutting and to retaliate against
it as the primary requirements of successful collusion.  However,
he emphasized detection.  In contrast, more recent work, from
Edward J. Green and Robert Porter (1984) on, has concentrated on
the nature of optimal retaliation, and taken the detection
probability as parametric.  Studying the Sugar Institute refocuses
our attention on detection, in revealing how firms may enhance it
by altering their environment through both specific rules and5
institutional structure, including communication.  The costs of
such a strategy in foregone profits from price discrimination and
cost efficiencies are made clear as well.
We find the current formal theory of collusion wanting in
three respects.  First, the theory ignores the inevitable
incompleteness of collusive agreements.  Conclusions about the role
of renegotiations are especially misleading because of this
neglect.  In contrast, we show that the meetings embodied a
governance structure for the agreement, ensuring its adaptation to
(typically endogenous) changing circumstances.  Second, the theory
provides no role for rich communication within the agreement.  We
show the crucial role provided by ex-ante notification and ex-post
determination of fault at the weekly meetings.8
Finally, as Margaret C. Levenstein (1997) has shown, the
theory incorrectly predicts that cheating (which should not even
occur in equilibrium!) will always be met by competitive, or sub-
competitive, conditions.  We see such harsh punishments only in
response to massive cheating.  Occasional incidents of cheating
were typically not retaliated against.  Open violations, or
consistent patterns of cheating in a single dimension were matched
in degree and kind.  We argue that the contractual arrangements for
sales agents help explain the limited retaliation.  
Section I presents evidence that the Institute raised margins
and profits.  This establishes that the collusive efforts were at6
least partially successful, and so merit further investigation.
Section II details the collusive mechanism, rule fixing, and the
benefits and costs it entailed.  Section III interprets the
Institute as an incomplete collusive agreement.  Sections IV and V
explore how ex-ante notification and ex-post determination of fault
supported the agreement, while Section VI documents firms’ response
to its violation.  Section VII shows that the firms did not
transfer market shares or infer cheating from variations in them,
as existing theories predict.  Section VIII concludes.
I Performance
How successful was the Sugar Institute?  Table 1 lists some
relevant yearly statistics.  As David Genesove and Wallace P.
Mullin (1997, 1998) showed, the simple production technology of
cane sugar refining affords direct measures of marginal cost and so
of the price-cost margin as well.  To produce a pound of refined
sugar, one needs 1.075 pounds of raw sugar, the price of which
constitutes most of the cost of refining.  Column (2) presents the
"proper margin", the difference between the price of refined and
1.075 times the price of raw.  Column (3) subtracts an additional
60 cents per hundred pounds, which represents all non-raw sugar
variable costs of refining.9  The establishment of the Sugar
Institute in December 1927 is coincident with an increase of the
margin of about 20 to 25 cents per hundred pounds over the7
preceding three years.  As column (4) shows, this increase is a
more than doubling of the Lerner Index.  Of course, the use of list
prices runs into the obvious difficulty that the Institute was
established in response to the pervasiveness of secret price cuts.
However, any bias only strengthens our conclusion:  so long as the
Sugar Institute eliminated or at the very least did not exacerbate
the secret concessions, the increase in the list price provides a
lower bound for the increase in the actual price.
An increase in the price cost margin indicates only that
collusion was enhanced. How close that is to fully collusive
pricing depends on the elasticity of the relevant demand curve.  In
our earlier work, we show that the elasticity of demand for cane
sugar during the 1890-1914 period was about 1.75.  That would
indicate a monopoly Lerner Index of 57 percent, far above the
margins under the Sugar Institute.  This discrepancy is explained
in part by the post-War growth of beet sugar, which would have
increased the demand elasticity for cane, and in part by the desire
to deter both foreign and domestic entrants. A more realistic
benchmark for monopoly pricing would be eleven percent.  This was
the margin in 1892, when both the margin and American’s market
share reached their greatest level (the latter at 92 percent of the
market).  By that measure, the refiners managed to raise the Lerner
Index to about three-quarters of its monopoly level.
The quantity  series, though less dramatic, is also consistent8
with an increase in market power.  Column (5) shows that the output
of the Atlantic refiners fell with the establishment of the Sugar
Institute.  The decrease in output is small, as sugar demand is
relatively inelastic.  Output continued to fall in the latter part
of the Sugar Institute period.  The decline is undoubtedly due to
the Great Depression, although it is much less than the 24 percent
fall in total industrial output.  The relative stability of sugar
production is consistent with Christina D. Romer's (1990) finding
that the onset of the Great Depression was associated with much
sharper cutbacks in purchases of durables than of non-durables.  It
is also due to low prices for raw sugar, itself a consequence of
rising subsidies in producer nations and the 1934 reduction in the
tariff on Cuban raw sugars (Bill Albert and Adrian Graves, 1988,
p.9).
As one would expect, rivals outside of the collusive agreement
responded to the price increase by increasing their own output.
Column (8) shows an increase in imports of refined sugar, which
originated almost entirely in Cuba.  Coca-Cola, the largest
purchaser of refined sugar, was among those firms that shifted
entirely to foreign suppliers.10  Previously a negligible flow of
less than half a percent of total U.S. consumption, foreign refined
sugar increased to 6 percent in the first year of the Sugar
Institute and continued to increase until it reached almost 15
percent in 1933, after which it was reduced by legislative fiat in9
the Sugar Act of 1934 to 11 percent.  The share of beet sugar
production (column (7)), whose producers lay outside of the Sugar
Institute as well, also rose, from an average share of 15.4 percent
in the four years before the Sugar Institute, to an average of 17.7
percent in the first four years of the Institute before the Sugar
Act, although the year to year variability here is such that one
can not clearly attribute the rise to the Institute’s formation.
Prices, profit margins and the like are all measures of market
power.  They tell us the degree to which collusion is successful.
They say nothing about how it is achieved.  For that, we must
consider the actual mechanism of collusion, that is, the Sugar
Institute - its rules, its meetings and the means by which it
ensured compliance with those rules.  
II Collusion by Rules
The Sugar Institute system combined implicit collusion on
price with explicit collusion on business practices.  The latter
complemented the former, the ultimate goal, by making price cuts
more transparent.  In this section, we outline the agreement on
business practices.  In the next three sections, we explore how,
through communication, explicit collusion sustained the agreement.
Rule number one of the Sugar Institute was the requirement of
"open prices and publicly announced terms", and so
nondiscriminatory pricing.  The attendant provisions that prices be10
posted on the refiners' bulletin boards, that the Institute be
notified of all changes both in price and methods of pricing, and
that price changes be announced no later than 3:00 p.m. merely
continued existing industry practice. 
The remaining rules primarily consisted of restrictions on
contractual practices between the refiners and downstream firms -
brokers, wholesalers and retailers -, and among downstream firms
themselves.  The breadth and detail of the restrictions were
remarkable.  For example, the Institute disallowed quantity
discounts, allowances for the return of sugar bags, long term
contracts and certain types of credit arrangements.  It required
refiners to report it all sales of damaged sugar.  It drew up a
list of permissible consignment points - cities where refiners
stored sugar on their own account.  The Institute went so far as to
forbid certain downstream activities, namely brokerage and storage,
being combined within the same firm!  Enforcement of this last rule
engaged the Institute in private investigation and auditing.
The stated aim of these rules was to eliminate discriminatory
pricing.  This claim was repeated as part of the refiners' legal
defense, but why it would have been in their interest to do so was
never explained.  The defendants noted that this ensured compliance
with the Clayton Act's prohibition on price discrimination, but
were silent on why compliance required collective action. 
To the economist, the Institute's rules smack of facilitating11
practices.  Collusive agreements are constantly in danger of being
undermined by secret price cuts.  Since a collusive agreement
results in a price above any firm's individually optimal price,
participant firms have an individual incentive to undercut this
price slightly and receive a larger share of industry demand and
profits.  A firm that cheats will want to undercut secretly in
order to avoid retaliation from other producers.  Anything that
makes detection of a secret price cut more likely enhances
collusion.  At least if they are adhered to, the requirements of
"open prices and publicly announced terms" clearly make cheating
more evident.  Complex, differentiated contractual terms may hide
price cuts under other names, and so restrictions on contracting
practices would serve a similar role to the open pricing
requirement.  Thus, the Sugar Institute was primarily a mechanism
to increase the probability of detection of secret price cuts,
thereby facilitating collusion.
The refiners worked to enhance detection and not reduce
reaction time, because the industry's long standing "moves" system,
in effect even before the establishment of the Sugar Institute,
already made the effective reaction lag nearly zero.  Under this
system, announced price decreases took effect immediately, while
price increases took effect only after a day had passed.  That gave
buyers, who purchased a month's worth of sugar at a time, the
incentive to refrain from purchasing immediately after a price12
decrease until other, perhaps preferred, firms matched it (which
they always did) and perhaps to benefit from a further fall in
price.  In practice, firms' reactions often came in minutes, and a
day proved long enough for all reactions to be registered and for
the price to settle.  So price competition preceded trade.  Thus by
decreasing its publicly announced price a firm could not hope to
`steal the market'.  Only secret discounts could steal customers
away from other firms.
The Sugar Institute rules were so wide ranging and detailed,
because virtually every contractual term could mask a price cut.
We consider five of these rules.
Water Damaged or Frozen Sugar.  It seems reasonable that such
sugar sell at a discount.  But a refiner could ship undamaged sugar
to a favored customer, invoice it for damaged sugar, and claim, if
questioned later, that the sugar was damaged.  So for each such
sale, the rules required “full details of amount, location, reason
and price to be circulated by the Institute.”11   
Likewise, favorable credit terms secretly extended to buyers
could substitute for a price cut.  A long standing industry
practice granted a two percent discount for cash payment.  But
refiners would vary the length of the grace period necessary to
qualify for the discount.  The Institute forbade this.
   Storage rates.  Prior to the Institute’s ban, many brokers
also operated warehouses that stored sugar for customers.  Acting13
on behalf of a refiner with whom they had a long-term relationship,
the broker could substitute a discount on the storage payment for
a cut in the price of refined itself.  The refiner would then
compensate the broker by routing an un-intermediated purchase offer
through the broker, for example.12
Delivery Time (Contract Enforcement).  Customers did not have
to take delivery immediately, but could spread out deliveries
against a contract over 30 or more days.  Allowing favored buyers
to take delivery beyond the contracted date not only saved them
storage and interest payments, it also constituted a preferred
price if the basis price rose in the meanwhile.  So the Institute
insisted that delivery dates be enforced.
Freight rates offered yet another way of giving a price cut,
although only on rates not regulated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC).  For that reason, the Sugar Institute discouraged
use of private water charters by requiring every such shipment to
be registered.  It also asked the charters to quote uniform rates
for all customers, and even demanded a written commitment from
shippers not to rebate freight to customers.13  When the lower water
rates proved too tempting to both refiners and their brokers, the
refiners moved to delivered pricing, as described in Section III.
Colluding in this manner was not costless.  By adopting these
restrictions, the firms forewent additional profits from the
differential treatment of customers.14  These lost profits, which14
a monopolist would have earned, derived not only from price
discrimination, but also efficiencies of various kinds, especially
in shipping.  When large buyers in Buffalo asked to receive
delivery by water barge (technically more convenient for the
buyers), even if charged at the much higher railroad rate, the
Institute refused for fear of creating the opportunity for granting
discounts.15  On a larger scale, the move to delivered pricing led
to refiners replacing brokers in the transportation of sugar by
water barge.16  Presumably, the original integration configuration
was the more efficient one. The refiners also ran the risk of
backward integration by their large customers thus denied quantity
discounts, as A&P threatened to do.17  
The prohibition of long-term contracts, and tolling contracts,
where the buyer financed the raw sugar purchase, clearly also meant
lost efficiencies.18  The requirement that all purchased sugar be
delivered within 30 days led to a secondary market, where "second
hand sugar", offered by customers who had over bought, sold at a
discount ranging between 5 and 20 cents.  Any transaction costs in
buying and selling would make that development a social loss.
Placé, in particular, was prepared to forego certain
efficiencies from the allocation of production according to cost.
He so feared different prices, that he did not want local
differences in loading or shipping costs to lead to differential
rates.  “Those enjoying more economical loading conditions can15
pocket the profits”, he wrote in a letter to the Institute.19 
Coordinated action via a trade association was not obviously
illegal.  Indeed, there were numerous “open price” associations at
the time,20 many inspired by Arthur Jerome Eddy's 1912 book The New
Competition and promoted by the Federal Trade Commission.  But a
series of Supreme Court decisions in the early 1920s had left the
legal status of trade association activities unclear.  Also, the
Sugar Institute’s activities were clearly on the edge of the
permissible.21  Indeed, its members were extremely conscious of the
legal consequences of their deliberations.22  They had the initial
Code of Ethics vetted by the Department of Justice, which
nonetheless later prosecuted the refiners, obtaining a 1936 Supreme
Court decision outlawing most of the Institute's practices. 
II.A An Alternative Hypothesis:  Quality Suppression
There is an alternative, yet still collusive, explanation for
the contractual restrictions.  Many of these rules can be
understood as limitations on either quality or within firm variety,
for contractual harmonization typically involved choosing the lower
`quality' level.  The grace period for payment was set at seven,
and not at fourteen days, the number of consignment points were cut
by half,23 etc.  In this interpretation, the rules were meant to
shut down non-price competition and so were directly collusive,
instead of merely facilitating collusion.  16
There was undoubtedly some suppression of non-price
competition involved, but at best this explanation is incomplete.
First, it fails to account for many of the rules.  These include
the prohibition on quantity discounts, the refusal to deal with
warehouse-affiliated brokers or shippers that did not openly
announce their rates, as well as other transportation policies.
The rules on prior notification discussed in Section IV below are
particularly difficult to interpret in this manner.  Second, the
number of different sugar grades itself was not restricted.  This
was so even though the proliferation of grades was costly to the
smaller refineries through lost economies of scale in packaging.24
Third, and most persuasively, the alternative argument does not
capture the intermediate goal of eliminating discriminatory
pricing.  The Institute's Code of Ethics has as its first principle
that "all discrimination between customers should be abolished."
This goal is a central theme not only throughout the published Code
but also in the notes on the private meetings.  
Nonetheless, we do not reject this argument completely.
Rather, we view the suppression of non-price competition as
complementary to contractual harmonization.  Both quality and
variety are often over provided from the industry's point of view.
If one is already choosing, and enforcing, one single contractual
standard among many, one might as well limit non-price competition
along the way.17
III Incomplete Collusive Agreements
"Although [oligopoly] is often thought of as a market
structure problem, it becomes a contracting problem when it is
phrased in terms of the comparative efficacy of cartel agreements."
(Oliver Williamson, 1996, p. 8) 
The unavoidable conclusion from reading the Placé memoranda is
that the initial agreement was incomplete, in the sense used in the
theory of the firm.  Collusive agreements are incomplete for the
usual reason that it is impossible to anticipate, enumerate and
work through all contingencies. Indeed, the need to "fill in gaps"
in the initial agreement was explicitly recognized by the refiners
in writing to the Court that the Code of Ethics was not and “could
not be, self-operative. ... [I]t required interpretation and
administration and consultation and the collection of information,
[which] the Institute was set up to provide”.25   
The weekly meetings allowed the refiners to “complete the
contract” in several different ways.  Least important was the
opportunity to adapt to changing external circumstances, for the
technology and demand of refined sugar barely changed over the
period of the Institute.  Aside from the rare mention of a new
demand substitute, such as liquid sugar, or a small scale
innovation like bagging refined sugar in paper lined raw sugar
bags, such issues do not arise in the Placé memoranda.2618
The meetings also allowed the refiners to perfect the
agreement under unchanging external conditions.  This included
addressing minor questions left unclear by the Code and subsequent
amendments.   Can damaged sugar be sold under a price guarantee?
No. Is it “permissible to store in the warehouse of a broker who
does not handle sugar?” Yes.  May one entertain a broker?  Yes.  Do
30 day contracts end on the 30th day after the start of the
contract, or on the same day of the next month?  The former.  Are
contracts to be considered filled by telephone or telegraphic
order, or only if invoiced?  The latter.27  
More importantly, certain rules were found to be unworkable,
and had to be modified.  The original Institute policy required
refiners to charge the ICC regulated all-rail rate, regardless of
the actual transportation mode used.  Removing the discretion from
refiners to set their own tariffs meant that refiners' greater
market power in their hinterlands were leveraged to more
competitive markets, such as the Great Lakes, where all refiners
marketed their sugars.28  However the availability of cheaper,
albeit slower, water, or combined rail and water, routes offered
too great an arbitrage opportunity to others.  So the rules were
changed to permit differential rates under a limited set of
circumstances, for “inconsiderable” quantities.  This new regime
proved unworkable, in part because refiners themselves were tempted
by these routes, which facilitated secret price concessions both on19
and off the routes.  So the refiners switched to a system of
delivered prices coupled with a refusal to sell f.o.b. refinery.
This move to delivered pricing, delayed for over a year out of
fear of the anti-trust authorities, was ostensibly accomplished by
the independent actions of the refiners, given the dubious legality
of the Institute taking such a step.  But the Placé memos show the
move to be a coordinated act that required several meetings over a
single week, in which suitable rates were discussed and a leader
emerged among the firms.29 
Perhaps the most important adaptation function lay in closing
unintended loopholes.  The Institute was constantly regulating some
new practice, as the elimination of one method of secret price
concession would give rise to a new, albeit less effective, one -
much in the same way as taxpayers’ or firms’ response to tax or
government regulations will give rise to new rules.  Thus
initially, only storage in a warehouse owned by a customer was
prohibited.  But as Institute regulations foreclosed that and other
avenues for giving secret concessions, refiners began storing in
broker-affiliated warehouses, and the rule had to be changed to
prohibit storage there as well.
These decisions were formalized by issuing a series of Code
Interpretations, which possessed a quasi-judicial character, an
analogy not lost on Institute members.  When C.&H. questioned the
legality of enforcing adherence to the Interpretations, since only20
the Code itself had been approved by the Department of Justice, the
Institute Counsel deemed the former "absolutely indispensable. Even
national laws must be `interpreted' by the Courts because it is
impossible to foresee, at the time of writing the law, all the
circumstances to which it will apply.  In the same way the Code
must be interpreted in the light of particular circumstances."30
Legal imagery permeates the Placé memoranda.  The participants
spoke of evidence, as we shall see, and precedent.  A decision on
rates to cities served by the New York Canal was later taken as
applicable, “[o]n the same principle”, to rates throughout the
Great Lakes region.31 Inquiries about the operation of a public
warehouse for sugar were deemed "covered by the decision in the
Bridgeman Russell case."32
Given the centrality of rules in this collusive mechanism, one
should perhaps not be surprised by the imagery.  But the legality
also had real effects.  Legal principles help `complete the
contract’ by extending one decision to cover many subsequent
incidents, as well as minimizing disputes.  They also allow
participants to anticipate others’ response.  One might also argue
that the legal approach delayed, and perhaps restricted,
retaliation against violations of the agreement, as we shall see.
IV Prior Notification
Prior notification of impending actions was an integral part21
of the Sugar Institute mechanism.  Institute rules required a firm
to notify other members before selling damaged sugar, introducing
new private brands, and changing any terms of trade.  While in
practice the reports on damaged sugar sales took place shortly
afterwards,33 the rule on private brands - sugar marketed through
a grocery chain with the latter’s label, often at a discount - was
clearly followed.34 
We see numerous examples of notification of future changes in
shipping tariffs or policies more generally in the Placé memos.
For example, when Revere, a Boston refiner, considered reducing its
rail shipments rates from the rail rate to the water rate, it first
told the Institute.  Arbuckle preceded its public announcement of
its decrease in freight rates by a private announcement to
Institute members.  And C&H informed the Institute of its probable
intention to spread the price guarantee to other states.35
But notification was used even when it was not explicitly
required by the agreement. Arbuckle Brothers anticipated
(preempted?) opposition by announcing that some grocers had
advertised its brand and that it wanted "to go on record as stating
that such ads are at the expense of the grocers".36 
Prior notification served two purposes.  First, it was an
attempt to eliminate the retaliatory lag in the non-price domain.
As such, it was complementary to the rule of “open announcement”
of prices and other terms of trade to buyers, which was directed at22
shortening the detection lag.  It is well known theoretically that
full collusion is possible when firms can respond to others’
deviations before consumers act,37 and the combination of frequent
meetings and prior notification allowed firms to do so.
The notification rule operated on the higher level of a two
level agreement.  At the lower level was a precise agreement
comprised of codes, amendments and resolutions that detailed
permissible actions, such as described in Section II.  At the
higher level was an understanding of adherence to these lower level
rules.  This meta-understanding permitted refiners to remove
themselves from the lower level rules.  But they were expected to
notify the other members of their intention to do so beforehand. 
Of course, notification must be timely to be effective.  In
its Brief to the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice cited an
Institute rule that notification be given at least 15 days before
taking any action that violated a Board of Directors’ decision.
However, we have no independent verification of that claim.
Notification can also be in the individual interest of a firm.
Consider an action which is privately profitable once other firms
have responded to it, but which will take market share away from
other firms if unanticipated by them.  Taking market share away
from rivals risks retaliation.  In the price domain, for example,
a decrease from above the monopoly price, if anticipated and
matched, will leave the price cutter (and its rival) better off23
than before; but if unanticipated and thus unmatched, the  decrease
will give the initiating firm the whole of the market, and though
temporarily more profitable, thus risk a retaliatory price war.
38
The Placé memos contain an explicit recognition of this
function.  The Godchaux representative 
praised the attitude of Savannah who, when faced with the
necessity of changing their method of doing business in
order to meet competition last Fall, did not rush through
an announcement [to the public].  Instead, they waited
for a Board meeting at which they explained conditions as
they found them and discussed with other refiners the
necessity for action on their part.  Their subsequent
announcements, because understood, did not cause any
upheavals.  Other refiners recently have not followed
this policy with the result that, when revolutionary
announcements are made, retaliatory announcement are made
by other refiners thereby plunging the industry into
deplorable and expensive practices.39
As we shall see, notification also preceded retaliatory action.
Deferring action until notification was possible carried a cost of
retaliatory delay, at the benefit of reduced misunderstandings.
Notice that all the cases considered here concern an easing of24
the terms of trade.  In the usual example of notification, the
Ethyl case40, prior announcement was made of an intended toughening
of sale conditions - a nominal price increase in an inflationary
environment.  That gave firms an opportunity to see if other firms
would follow them, or not.  In that case, notification served as a
coordinating mechanism for an action that, when taken by all firms,
would benefit them, but if taken by one firm alone, would harm it.
V Ex-Post Determination
The Sugar Institute meetings also provided a forum for
accusation and rebuttal.  For example, in March of 1929, American
charged Federal with secretly cutting prices by loading barges
without charge.  American argued that
[F.O.B.] meant that the sugar must be placed within reach
of the tackle of either the ship or the barge.  Several
people testified ... that this had been the
interpretation in the past and that all loading and
unloading charges had always been construed as being for
account of the vessel.  [Federal] took the position that
F.O.B. means literally "free on board" and the condition
visualized by [American] could be correctly described as
"F.A.S." meaning free alongside."4125
Reading this, one is led to ask why the firms bother arguing
at all.  If one firm thinks that the other has cheated, why not
just retaliate?  Why the need to prove the point?
There are two reasons to first investigate.  First, there may
have been no intention to break the agreement.  Perhaps Federal did
not mean to capture additional market share by loading the barges,
and thought that other firms were acting as it did.  As in the
Green and Porter model (1984), the evidence for cheating is never
unambiguous, although here it is a misunderstanding - an "`honest
mistake' by rivals concerning the nature of the `agreement'" (David
Kreps, 1990, p. 529) - not a drop in industry demand, that
confounds.  A similar difference of opinion arose about the
deadline for payment of sugar shipped by barge from New Orleans.42
Other times, the confounding factor was indeed a change in
external factors.  Thus the failure to force delivery on customers
at the end of 30 days was variously determined to be due not to
cheating, but to the difficulty of obtaining barges, vacuum pans
and other unforeseen events.  The accusation could be factually
wrong: a concession on one barrel of caked sugar was wrongly
reported as a concession on a much larger amount of powdered sugar
by a Sugar Institute investigator.43  Or a firm employee or direct
broker may simply have made an error in invoicing or shipping.44
Unlike in Green and Porter (1984), there is a mechanism here -
the Sugar Institute's meetings - by which firms can first judge26
whether cheating has in fact occurred before taking action.  The
Sugar Institute served as a court in which an accused firm might
prove its innocence, in some cases on factual, in others on
logical, grounds.  In doing so, the Institute raised the signal to
noise ratio of indicators of cheating, to use a more prosaic
metaphor.
A second reason not to retaliate immediately is the need to
first garner support among the other firms.  If the accusing firm
acts alone, it may stand accused of cheating itself, and be subject
to retaliation.  Such was the case for Godchaux in retaliating
against Savannah, as described in Section VI below.
As a result, accusing firms could not rely on their own
beliefs alone, but required evidence. Evidence had to be not only
observable, but legally verifiable as well - to use the language of
contract theory.  Placé informs his readers (fellow McCahan
executives) of an accusation that Godchaux was selling sugars to
Edgar.  This was a violation of Institute regulations because
Edgar, a large, prominent, and aggressive, Detroit brokerage firm,
was engaged in storage as well.  An invoice uncovered by an
Institute investigator that appeared to document a sale was offered
as evidence.  Placé examined the invoice after the meeting. 
I am afraid that [the investigators] are off on the wrong
track... [T]his invoice is merely part of Godchaux's27
bookkeeping method...I do not doubt that the 20 cars are
eventually to be merchandised by Edgar but ... [Godchaux]
is too clever to commit a faux pas such as [the
investigator] thought he had uncovered.45
With the invoice no longer probative, all the refiners were
notified of the "the error which apparently had been made."46 
VI Cheating and Retaliation
In the theory of implicit collusion, the response to a
deviation is
simple in the extreme.  A deviation by player i is always
treated the same way regardless of the nature of the
deviation, the period in which it occurred, the
particular path in progress, or the point on the path at
which the defection occurred.  There is no need to
"tailor the punishment to fit the crime" (David Pearce,
1992, p. 140).47
What we observe is quite different.  Firms did cheat. A
Detroit chain store received a secret price concession when it
switched from National to Spreckels.  Spreckels overpaid truckers
who then worked a few hours "free" for certain customers.  Arbuckle28
knowingly sold to a dummy corporation that fronted for Edgar.48  All
this was done secretly, then uncovered by the Institute.
Cheating was particularly bad in the South.  Godchaux broke
Institute regulations twice over in accepting a contract with a
price guarantee for delivery by water barge, whose movements it
agreed not to trace.  Texas City accepted a 42 day contract - an
offense serious enough that the owner offered to fire his top three
executives over it.  That same refiner later absorbed storage
charges through a dummy corporation.  Colonial offered a six cent
rebate to large buyers.  And in Tampa, post-dated checks were used
to give credit.49 
Yet, outside of the South, neither in prices nor in rules were
these individual violations met by reversion to competitive
conditions a la Green and Porter (1984), let alone sub-competitive
conditions, a la Dilip Abreu et al. (1986).  This is especially
noteworthy as the industry did experience sub-competitive prices a
generation earlier (Genesove and Mullin, 1997).  Rather, deviations
were either ignored or matched.  
Typically, when a specific incident of cheating was uncovered,
fault was determined, the refiner confessed or attempted to justify
it50- or more likely, blamed the broker51 - and then halted the
practice.  There the matter would end.  One can conjecture that one
refiner’s cheating would encourage another’s, but by the nature of
such a process it is impossible to connect one incident to a29
particular predecessor. 
Where the cheating continued over a longer period, or there
was an open violation of the agreement, the response was typically
to match the practice.  This is most evident in transportation
pricing.  When one firm openly lowered its rate for rail shipments
to the lower water barge rate, other firms would respond by
lowering their rail rates to the same level.52  When the Pacific
refiners gave a freight allowance on certain contracts, American
announced that it would match it.53 The punishment was indeed
"tailored to fit the crime".
Matching was not only in degree but also in kind.  In
responding to a violation, rival firms have at their discretion not
only the extent of retaliation, but the instrument as well.  For
example, in response to the invoicing of a rail shipment at the
lower barge rate, in contradiction to the Institute rules,
retaliation need not be restricted to transportation pricing, but
in principle could include payment length, consignment policy,
sugar grades, and even price.  Indeed, just as Douglas Bernheim and
Michael Whinston (1990) have shown that, where there is multimarket
conduct, collusion can be enhanced when punishment encompasses all
markets, so one would expect that collusion would be enhanced by
punishing a deviator with all possible instruments at hand.  
It is surprising, then, to observe that the response to a
deviation was generally restricted to the instrument of violation.30
When, for example, Southern refiners failed to prevent the
diversion of shipments from states in which price was guaranteed
during shipment to where it was not, C.&H. introduced a guarantee
for Texan shipments and threatened to extend it to other Western
states.54  Likewise, when McCahan concluded that some refiners were
not uniformly enforcing the contract time limits, Placé first
threatened not to enforce McCahan’s terms either55 and then, with
others, carried out his threat. Likewise, Arbuckle Brothers
threatened to "meet secret competition by openly accepting
contracts for delivery ... over an indefinite delayed period."56
After several price moves over a period of months resulted in mixed
success in contract enforcement, the Institute proposed that each
refiner inform the trade that henceforth any sugar remaining on a
contract would be shipped to customers in bulk bags on the
contract’s expiration date. Savannah, although agreeing to send out
the letter, refused to enforce it, on the grounds that Hershey had
in the past done the same.  Colonial then conditioned its
enforcement on that of Savannah and C.&H.57  In yet another case,
when Arbuckle Brothers temporarily stopped adhering to the
Institute’s sugar standards, National and Penn stopped as well.58
This restricted pattern of retaliation is also present in the
enforcement of the separation of brokerage and storage activities
downstream.  Arbuckle Brothers threatened that if there were any
further shipments to brokers who doubled as warehouse operators,31
then it would begin supplying Edgar again.59
Matching was actually institutionalized in the enforcement of
the 30 day delivery rule, which firms continually broke by granting
extensions on the grounds of production schedules and transport
availability. To deal with this problem, the Institute required
refiners to report their quantity of undelivered contracts for each
price move.60  These weekly reports were circulated to all members
and discussed at a dedicated weekly meeting.  A large balance of
undelivered contracts revealed a firm as unlikely to meet the
contract due date, either because of capacity constraints in
production or transportation, or because the high balances signaled
an unwillingness to pressure customers to take delivery.  Other
refiners could then match by adjusting, or threatening to adjust,
their own contract enforcement.  This matching was eventually
further institutionalized by a short-lived  understanding “that all
refiners will be free to spread their own deliveries over the same
number of days as the most delayed refiner will require”, which
agreement was “not to be announced to the trade”.61   
These reports both sped up retaliatory matching and made it
more routine.  In their absence, a firm would not know precisely
how well others were forcing delivery until after the due date had
passed.  Retaliation could only then be through refusal to enforce
future contracts, or, like C&H before joining the Institute, on
other contractual terms.62  The reports permitted quick, nearly32
contemporaneous responses, precisely tailored to the violation.
Where retaliation did take the form of a reversion, or
threatened reversion, to competitive conditions, or worse, it was
only in response to large scale cheating in several dimensions.
This only occurred in the South, which was the periphery of the
market.   As early as June 1929, an Institute investigator reported
the Code of Ethics as “dead in the water" in Texas.
Compartmentalization broke down there.  C&H would not discuss any
single issue, but insisted that given the conditions, it would only
discuss all of them together.63 Arguing that Texan refiners "have
been guilty of many different violations of the Code",  C.&H.
threatened to "request the entire suspension of the Code of Ethics
in the Texas territory so that all refiners may be in position to
fight fire with fire."64  
Elsewhere in the South, Savannah was dissuaded from resigning
from the Institute, so that it might deal with the "unethical"
competition from the Cuban refiner Hershey, by a resolution which
authorized members “to `meet the competition of Hershey', provided
that the specific competitor and the exact territorial limits are
announced to the Institute."65  Thus the Institute agreed to suspend
the collusive agreement, so long as prior notification was given.66
The last example illustrates again how Institute membership
stymied firms from immediately responding to competition.
Retaliation was to be at the discretion of the Institute as a whole33
only.  When in November 1929, Godchaux withdrew its authorization
for the Institute to audit its stocks until Colonial ceased its
storing its sugar in buyer affiliated warehouses, and withholding
contract enforcement and other statistics67, the other refiners
disapproved; according to them, Godchaux was
taking a very arbitrary position.  Irrespective of
Colonial's activities, Godchaux has no right to secretly
indulge in unethical practices themselves ... If Godchaux
desires to meet Colonial competition it must be done
openly, as Savannah did in Southeastern territory.68
Our comments in this and the previous section paint a very
different picture of the response to a deviation than that imagined
in the formal theory.  Instead of meeting a single deviation with
immediate massive retaliation, there may be an attempt to determine
if it was indeed a conscious effort to break the agreement, or
rather a misunderstanding, or the product of external factors.
Threats may also precede any retaliation, in part to ensure it is
not misconstrued as a deviation, in part to allow the deviator to
back down.  Retaliation when, and if, it comes is limited to the
kind of violation and is typically to match it.  
Thus the refiners had chosen the opposite end of the tradeoff
between Type I and Type II errors to that of the Green and Porter34
(1984) equilibrium.  There, firms accept that they will punish when
cheating does not occur in order that cheating never occur; here,
firms accept some cheating so as not to punish inappropriately.
Collusion was nonetheless (imperfectly) sustained, because
wholesale cheating was retaliated against massively.
One reason to desist from full scale retaliation stems from
the vertical contractual arrangements in the industry.  Issues of
internal firm organization apparently dictated that the most
efficient contract between a firm and its sales agents entailed
brokerage, with brokers often dealing exclusively with specific
refiners.69  Brokers faced high powered incentives, with a fixed
percentage commission earned on every sale.  
This system was at odds with the collusive agreement in two
respects.  First, an exclusive broker had an incentive to “steal”
a customer from another firm through secret concessions.  Of
course, because refiners made a positive profit on every sale, this
would benefit the refiner as well.  But being one of many, instead
of one of fifteen, a broker’s incentive to deviate much exceeded a
refiner’s.  Viewed from the refiners’ perspective, brokers’
cheating added noise to demand, and so provided an opportunity for
firms to cheat by hiding behind their brokers, much like demand
shocks in Green and Porter.  Collectively through the Institute,
the refiners sought brokers’ adherence to the agreement through
blacklisting deviators (although refiners tended to protect their35
own), and instilling a culture of adherence to the codes.
Not only did the system make deviations more prevalent, it
made punishment more costly.  It is easy to see that continual
transitions between a “collusive” phase and a “punishment” phase
would be difficult to enact in such an environment.  One cannot
easily ask selling agents to one day adhere to one set of rules,
the next to another, and the day after to return to the first set
of rules, especially when the first set of rules stands in the way
of their (individual) profit opportunities.
Apparently, the tension between the desire of selling agents
to increase sales and the firm’s desire to abide by the agreement
was felt inside the firm, as legally defined, as well.  Arguing
that “the matter of contract enforcement cannot be left in the
hands of the Sales Department”, one firm announced that it had
established “an entirely separate department to handle contract
enforcement and enforcement will be accomplished without allowing
the prejudices and desires of the Sales department to interfere.”
Finally, we ask:  Why matching? Matching in price (where sales
are made before rivals can respond) will not deter undercutting, of
course, but the method can be effective for deviations in discrete
choices, such as for rules.  Robert Axelrod’s (1984) demonstration
of the robustness of a matching, or `tit for tat’, strategy in
computer simulations of the Prisoners’ Dilemma is well known.70
Less well known is subsequent work showing the robustness of the36
`generous tit for tat’ strategy (Axelrod, 1997, p.36-7) in which a
percentage of deviations are assumed to be `mistakes’, and so are
forgiven - as seems to have occurred here.  An additional appeal of
matching must have been that it was consistent with the ethic of
non-discrimination and symmetry that underlay the Code of Ethics.
Could what we have labeled as deviation followed by
retaliation by matching be better thought of as a move to a new
equilibrium, in which one firm leads, and the others follow in an
optimal response, however grudgingly?  There is some appeal to this
interpretation, at least when the violation was done openly.  But
the larger point remains.  We do not see the use of massive
retaliation to protect the original equilibrium, which the Folk
Theorems of implicit collusion would suggest could be sustained by
such response, and would be, when collusion is less than perfect.
VII  What Firms Did Not Do: Inference from Market Shares and Market
Allocation
Since in the Green and Porter model and its offshoots cheating
is inferred from an increase in a firm’s market share, it is
natural to ask, as some readers of earlier drafts of this paper
have, whether refiners used such information to police the accord.
Market share information was available to them, although at
somewhat low frequency (Genesove and Mullin, 1999), but was rarely
used in that fashion.  The one such inference in the Placé37
memoranda is the observation that Arbuckle had not been obtaining
its “proper quota of business”, apparently because brokers regarded
it as “too strict” in enforcing contracts.  The possibility that
American’s advertising is at fault instead is dismissed, since
other refiners’ sales had not fallen.  Half a year later, the
Arbuckle representative blamed its low share on its not being “as
liberal in meeting competition as McCahan” had been.  Placé
retorted that the “premise” was wrong.71
In Green and Porter (1984), a fall in market share, whatever
the reason, leads to a price war.  In the Placé memoranda, the
reason for the decline is crucial.  In a rather dramatic incident,
the president of C&H, not yet a member of the Institute, threatened
to “break the price” if, upon returning to San Francisco, he were
to discover that its sales had been low because of the failure of
Eastern refiners to enforce the 30 day limit.
In Dilip Abreu et al. (1990), Drew Fudenberg et al. (1994) and
Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2000), a firm that registers a decrease in
market share is compensated with  additional market share in future
periods.  There are a couple of discussions along these lines in
the memoranda.  Colonial having stated that “it will consider
itself at liberty `to meet the competition’ as it meets it .. The
consensus of opinion was that Colonial ha[d] suffered such a large
decrease in distribution that some means must be found to allow
them to catch up.”72  Because at this point the memoranda become38
quite spotty in their coverage of the meetings, we do not know why
Colonial’s sales had declined, and do not know whether “some means”
was found and acted upon (we suspect not).  Elsewhere, Placé hears
that American is forbidding second hand sugars from being
transferred to Boston, presumably to stop Revere, the local Boston
refiner, from dropping its price.  
Note, however, that as we pointed out in Section II, there was
no easy mechanism for reallocating market shares. 
There are thus imperfect echoes of these models of collusion
under imperfect public information in the memoranda, but they are
rare.  These four incidents are the only such ones in nearly a
hundred meetings over the eighteen month period.  Market share is
a noisy indicator of cheating; and with direct evidence available,
the refiners evidently preferred to rely on that instead.
Throughout the course of the Institute’s life there were calls
for a stronger agreement that would go beyond rules to exercise
control over production.  Indeed, that was the members initial
purpose in organizing, before their counsel told them they could
not do so.  Nonetheless, twice American proposed a market sharing
scheme.  In April 1929, it suggested a “formula” holding each
refiner’s output to its capacity under “War-time `control’ plus 50
percent of any subsequent increase in capacity.”  The issue “was
discussed at great length but no decision was arrived at”.  Then on
August 29 of that year, having waited for the official meeting to39
adjourn, the American representative proposed a specific market
share for each firm (with a decrease in every share except
American’s).  For neither proposal was any enforcement mechanism
offered, and, in fact, nothing came of either, so that almost a
year later, one participant complained “that, in spite of all the
pretty speeches which have been made on [self-regulation], there is
no evidence of this principle being put into practice.”  He was
answered that ”unfortunately, the Institute’s attorney does not
allow discussion of this subject on a basis which could bring
actual results.”73
A couple of refiners called for consolidating the industry.
The C.&H. president spoke of removing two or three refiners.74
Spreckels called for “three or at most four companies control[ling]
all the refineries of the country.”75  But there were no mergers or
acquisitions during this period.
Calls for coordinated market withdrawals were left unfulfilled
as well.  C.&H. prepared a map "to show that, if the Western
territory is not invaded by Atlantic Coast and Gulf refiners,
Western producers would be able to distribute these products
without coming south or east."76   But the eastern refiners were
hardly prepared to cede the important market of Chicago.  Placé
demanded a “deliberate plan for the curtailment of the operation of
the [then non-member] C.&H.”, and in response the Institute decided
to ask the Hawaiian planters to sell a larger part of their raw40
sugar to the Eastern refiners, rather than C.&H.  But there is no
further mention of this, and C.&H.'s production was not cut back.77
These are the only discussions of stronger collusive schemes
in Placé.  The Sugar Institute was at the edge of allowable
behavior, “pioneers” at the “frontier”, as its counsel was to say
on the eve of the trial, “beyond anything” the courts had approved,
although not necessarily yet forbidden.78  Through its communicative
organs it could do much better than simply inferring cheating from
public information.  To collude more explicitly, would clearly have
been illegal.  To merge was impossible, given the government’s 1910
anti-trust suit against American.  Unfortunately for the refiners,
the Court would decide that their practices were also illegal, and
push back the “frontier”.
VII Conclusion
We have emphasized the Sugar Institute's role as a mechanism
for governance and a forum for communication among the refiners.
However, it fulfilled two additional functions.  The more important
of the two was its role as a neutral party among the firms.  That
allowed the Institute to audit them.  It also collected information
while protecting its confidentiality, aggregating self-reported
firm-level statistics into industry totals that were then reported
back to the firms.  Genesove and Mullin (1999) considers this role,
and so we have not pursued it here.41
There was an additional, strategic value to the embodiment of
the collusive agreement in an institution outside of the individual
firms.  In their bargaining with brokers or buyers, the refiners
sometimes used the Institute as a scapegoat.  More formally, firms
could commit to policies by having them formalized as Institute
rules.  However, this manoeuver was limited by the Institute's
counsel's warning that such claims would paint the Institute as a
consolidation and thus risk anti-trust prosecution.
It is useful to compare what we have learned here about
communication with a number of recent theoretical papers that have
explored the issue.   
We have stressed the adaptation value of frequent meetings.
It could be argued that such flexibility would come at the cost of
less credible punishment schemes, for frequent meetings might allow
firms to renegotiate their way out of punishments.  The theoretical
literature on renegotiation is inconclusive, although Barbara
McCutcheon (1997) has argued that the ability of colluding firms to
meet once an initial agreement has been reached would constrain the
agreement.  Certainly, that would help explain why retaliation
seems so weak in this market.  
However, we think that renegotiation was not a serious
impediment to collusion.  Clearly, the refiners did not see it as
so.  In choosing to have weekly meetings, the refiners obviously
valued the adaptation function higher than any risk of42
renegotiation of punishment.  The meetings continued at that
frequency, or higher at least until mid-1930, when the Placé memos
end.  No one ever suggested less frequent meetings.
Also, we see no evidence of renegotiation out of punishment.
The threats we document are never retracted.  Nor  do we see firms
bargain out of any punishment.  Of course, the possibility that a
punishment might be renegotiated might nonetheless determine the
structure of the agreement; in theoretical terms, one can always
construct a non-renegotiated equilibrium from the path of any
renegotiation-proof equilibrium.  But, (a) we have already noted
that in meeting so frequently the refiners must have been either
unaware or unconcerned with the possibility of renegotiation, and
(b) that theoretical conclusion presupposes an environment in which
all contingencies are foreseen.  This non-renegotiated equilibrium
is more properly seen as an artifact of the models, in the same
sense that the models predict that there will be no cheating in
equilibrium.  McCutcheon herself acknowledges that her model lacks
"incomplete contracting, imperfect monitoring, and meetings in
equilibrium" - all features of the Sugar Institute.
In their recent paper on price collusion with private
information, Athey et al. (2000) touch on certain issues that we
have emphasized here.  Thus they note that in the pursuit of a
workable collusive agreement, firms will often choose to give up
cost efficiencies.  We stressed the same point in Section II, but43
it is important to understand the difference between our paper and
theirs.  The foregone efficiencies in their model are privately
observed; whereas those we document here - delivering sugar by
water rather than rail, for example - are publicly known, and so,
as the authors themselves note in their conclusion, their collusive
scheme could easily and profitably accommodate them.  Thus a
different explanation for the foregone efficiencies is required.
We have offered the explanation that exploitation of these
efficiencies would threaten the homogeneity of business practices
that made pricing transparent.
In their conclusion, Athey et al. (2000) argue that their
model could rationalize a hypothetical situation in which one firm
openly lowers its price drastically and yet evokes no response.
They cite an earlier draft of this paper as providing support, in
the non-price domain, for such occurrences.  We think this is a
mistaken application of their model, for the cheating we describe
in Section VI are clearly “off-equilibrium”.  They are taken
secretly, and typically uncovered only by the Institute’s costly
investigation.
We have found the current theories of collusion to be
inadequate for representing what transpired in the Sugar Institute.
Existing theory has little to say about communication in collusion,
and those models that exist do not capture the richness of the
content of that communication.  Furthermore, the nature of44
retaliation for cheating is much more restrained than that imagined
by the existing theories.  We have also argued that the internal
organization of the firms, more specifically, the selling agents’
high powered incentives, help explain the limited retaliation.
Nonetheless, one should not lose sight of the overall success of
Stigler’s original insight in capturing the essentials of collusion
in this market.  The Sugar Institute and its rules were constructed
by firms in pursuit of the common goal of collusion but each well
aware of their individual, ex post incentive to undermine the
agreement once in place. 45
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                            Table 1
(1)     (2)      (3)  (4)    (5)      (6)       (7)    (8)
Year   Proper    Proper  Lerner  Output   Profits Beet    Foreign
       Margin    Margin  Index Share    Refined
                 -.60      Share
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1914    0.99     0.39    0.047    106      3.7
1915    0.95     0.35    0.036    114      3.9
1916    1.04     0.44    0.041    118      4.3
1917    1.31     0.70    0.068    103      7.4
1918    1.04     0.44    0.048     93      3.9
1919    0.88     0.27    0.029    121      4.2
1920    1.94     1.34    0.129    113     12.2
1921    1.06     0.46    0.073    128      6.0
1922    0.97     0.36    0.060    157      5.9
1923    0.88     0.28    0.033    123      3.3
1924    1.06     0.45    0.061    128      5.4 15.3  0.5
1925    0.80     0.19    0.035    143      2.6 16.1  0.5
1926    0.79     0.18    0.034    142      2.7 15.4     0.5
1927    0.74     0.14    0.023    130      2.0 14.7  2.5
1928    1.00     0.40    0.071    122      4.9 18.7  6.2
1929    1.00     0.39    0.077    128      5.1 14.7       8.3
1930    1.04     0.44    0.091    126      5.6 17.0  8.0
1931    0.96     0.36    0.071    107      3.8 20.5  9.6
1932    1.07     0.47    0.093    103      4.7 21.0 12.8
1933    1.14     0.54    0.093     99      5.3 21.6 14.7
1934    1.17     0.56    0.104     94      5.3 25.1 11.0
1935    1.07     0.47    0.083     96      4.4 22.1 11.1
1936    1.03     0.42    0.072     98      4.2
1937    1.03     0.43    0.077    108      4.9
1938    0.98     0.37    0.077    100      3.7
1939    1.01     0.41    0.079     99      3.9
1940    1.01     0.41    0.086    100      3.9
1941    0.85     0.25    0.048    116      3.0
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Columns (2) through (6) are weekly averages.  Column (2) shows the difference
between the price of refined sugar and 1.075 times the price of raw sugar, in
cents per pound.  Column (3) shows the difference between column (2) and .60, the
non-raw sugar component of variable cost per pound.  Column (4) presents the ratio
of that margin to the price of refined sugar.  Column (5) shows the output of the
Atlantic refiners, in millions of pounds.  Column (6) shows the sum of the
variable profits of the Atlantic refiners, in millions of dollars.  Columns (7)
and (8) present the annual shares of domestic beet sugar production and imported
refined sugar in total U.S. sugar consumption.  All prices are in December 1927
dollars.  The Sugar Institute was established in December 1927.
Source:  Prices of refined (standard granulated) and raw (96 centrifugal) and
output are taken from the weekly reports of Willett and Gray’s Weekly Statistical
Sugar Trade Journal.  The shares of domestic beet sugar production and imported
refined sugar are taken from the January issues of Willett and Gray’s Weekly
Statistical Sugar Trade Journal.